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The Road to Sharpeville
INTRODUCTION
The Sharpeville shootings are a landmark o-f the South African
past. People with only a fleeting knowledge of South African
history are aware of the events of 21 March 1960 and Sharpeville
Day is annually commemorated by opponents of apartheid all over
the world. Nevertheless, there is remarkably little awareness of
the local history of Vereeniging that led up to the shootings.
This history makes fascinating reading. For one of its
distinguishing characteristics was the success of the Vereeniging
Town Council's administration of its two African townships,
Sharpeville and Top Location. Throughout the 1950s Sharpeville
was recognised across the country as the model African township,
and the Council was able to censor almost all local African
political activity (1). In the light of this it was particularly
anomalous that the declaration of the State of Emergency in I960
should have been prompted by events in Sharpeville- However, most
accounts of the Sharpeville shootings have not even noticed this
anomaly, let alone offered any explanation for it <2). Rather,
they look at the background to the shootings only in terms of the
PAC's national campaign against the passes. It is a central
premise of this paper that such an approach to the problem of
explaining the Sharpeville shootings is inadequate- For it begs
the question of why it was in Sharpeville as opposed to anywhere
else in the Union that the PAC's campaign received its strongest
response, a question that can only be answered by examinining the
local history that led up to the shootings.
It is to this history, then, that I address myself in the
following paper. The paper's first two sections describe the
social and economic development of Vereeniging up to the 1950s
and the administration of its African townships- I then examine
tensions around police raids and rising rents that built up in
Vereeniging's townships over the 1950s, and relate these to
processes described in the first two sections. Finally I look at
the Council's removal of Top Location residents to Sharpeville in
1958/59, and show how the PAC was able to capitalise on the
residents' grievances relating to the removal and to the, issues
of raids and rent (3).
THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRY IN VEREENIGING
The development of heavy industry in Vereeniging started in 1911
when Sammy Marks founded the Union Steel Corporation to recycle
scrap metal. Two years later the steelworks were completed and
the first steel melted in South Africa was rolled into a bar on
November 15th 1913- The First World War boosted USCO's operations
by protecting it from foreign competition and providing it with a
vastly expanded market for its products in the form of the
munitions industry (4). In the years that followed, the presence
V of USCO served to ensure the development of Vereeniging into one
of the largest, centres of South Africa's metal industry. In 1927
Stewarts and Lloyds followed USCD to Vereeniging and set up the
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first South African tubemaking plant there (5). During the '30s
and '40s numerous smaller metal industries were established in
Vereeniging to take advantage of local steel and tubing supplies.
Many of these infant industries were helped onto their feet by
the offer of USCO to provide compound accomodation for their
workers (6). The Second World War triggered off a renewed boom
in Vereeniging's metal production as the South African government
geared itself to the requirements of military production and
large-scale import substitution by designating the Vaal area as
the country's heavy metal industrial growth point (7).
Initially, the establishment of ISCOR works at Vanderbijlpark in
in this regard in 1944 had threatened the survival of USCO, and
with it, Vereeniging's share of future Vaal industrial
development. USCO could not hope to compete with a state
subsidised corporation on the scale of ISCOR, but some skillful
lobbying on the part of the Vereeniging Town Council ensured that
it would not have to. An agreement was reached with the central
government to rationalise Vaal steel production. ISCOR would gain
a controlling interest in USCO and USCO would be assigned the
role of producing certain steels (8). Thus USCO's future was
guarranteed and Vereeniging continued to expand through the
forties and fifties. By 1959 the Mayor was able to talk of his
town as "the premier industrial centre of the Union" (9).
Vereeniging's rapid post-war industrial development was premised
on its established record as an industrial centre. Whereas other
municipalities had to prove to industrialists that they were
capable of providing adequate infrastructural facilities before
they could sell their industrial erven, Vereeniging could point
to its successful history of providing for manufacturers that
included USCO and Stewarts and Lloyd. To capitalists looking for
a location for a factory this history was worth a great deal.
Thus the Vereeniging Town Council was able to sell heavy
industrial erven in its Duncanville township which was developed
in the early 50s, at as much as *700/acre (10), while in Springs/
the local Council could only find buyers for similar erven at
*100/acre (11).
The proven facilities that Vereeniging could offer in the early
*50s were wide-ranging. They included, most obviously, abundant
supplies of water from the Vaal Dam and cheap coal from
surrounding collieries. From 1945 Vereeniging could draw
electricity from the Klip and Vaal Power Stations with respective
outputs of 424MW and 330MW (12). These power supplies were
strained in the early fifties as the town expanded even more
quickly than anticipated (13) but the construction of Taaibos and
Highveld Power stations in 1954 and 1959 respectively added an
extra 960MW of output that forestalled any serious power
shortages (14). Vereeniging was on the main rail line south from
the Rand to the Natal coast, and boasted impressive marshalling
yards that were built by the Council in 1952 (15). the Council
had also built a rail link to Duncanville and sidings on all the
heavy industrial stands within the township (16). This was a
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particularly important service -for manufacturers as the South
African Railways did not have road transport -facilities to bring
plant and machinery from the Vereeniging station to factory sites
<17>.
In addition to providing infrastructural facilities that compared
favourably with any in the Union, the Vereeniging Town Council
showed themselves to be remarkably flexible in dealing with local
industrialists. They were content to leave the larger employers
to run their compounds with as little municipal interference as
possible. Compound inspections were infrequent and were always
preceded by a minimum of seven days' notice (18). As we shall see
later, they repeatedly turned a blind eye to influx control
violations committed by employers and their workers and were
generally quick to retract any measures that le.d to protests from
local industry as was the case when they attempted to introduce
pollution regulations along the lines of those of the
Johannesburg City Council (19).
Good council/industry relations that this sort of flexibility
produced were cemented by a number of joint lobbying projects.
The first of these was the successful campaign to ensure the
survival of USCD when ISCQR came to Vanderbijlpark. Close
cooperation between representatives of the Council and local
industry was also instrumental in influencing the government to
site SASOL 1 opposite Vereeniging in Sasolburg and another ISCOR
plant in Meyerton, some seven miles north of the municipal
boundary <20). Another display of joint Council/industry
mobilisation came in the publicity campaign to sell industrial
stands in Duncanville. Advertisements.were taken out in all
major newspapers in the Union as well as in the Times and
Guardian in England (21) and arising out of the campaign, a
Vereeniging Publicity Committee was formally established with
representatives from the Council, the Vereeniging Chamber of
Commerce, the Vereeniging and District Chamber of Industries and
the Vereeniging Afrikaanse Sakekamer (22).
The Publicity Committee's Duncanville campaign was highly
successful. Duncanville was bought by the Council for $250 000
in 1350 (23) and the sale of stands started almost immediately.
By the end of the year sales were proceeding ahead of schedule
and the Council was particularly pleased to note that prominent
British multi- nationals, Babcock and Uilcox Engineering and
Raleigh Cycles had chosen Duncanville as the site from which to
commence their South African operations (24). But Council plans
for the development of Duncanville soon ran into problems.
Bureaucratic delays in the offices of the Administrator of the
Transvaal and the Surveyor General (25) meant that the
proclamation of Duncanville as an industrial township was delayed
until rnid-1952. Prior to the proclamation industrial production
in Duncanville was not permissable and the years 1950-52
witnessed a stream of angry letters to the Council from Raleigh,
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Babcock and Wilcox and other companies who had been attracted to
Duncanville by the advertising drive, demanding to know when they
would be able to start production (2£>-
the Council's Duncanville problems did not end in 1952- Tor
barely three years after the proclamation, demand for industrial
stands had outstripped Duncanville's capacity (27) and Council
attempts to have an extension to the township proclaimed were
running into more bureaucratic obstacles. The natural development
of Duncanville was onto land that was currently occupied by the
municipal African township, Top Location or Topville. When
Duncanville was being planned in the late '40s, this had not
seemed a problem because Topville was in the process of being
de.mol ished. Residents were steadily being removed to
Sharpeville, some two miles out of town and the removals were
projected to be complete by the early '50s <2B>. By April 1351,
however, the removals had, for practical purposes, stopped- There
were still over 9000 residents living in Topville (23), but the
Council was unable to remove them because it had no approved
housing schemes into,which they might be transferred. This
remained true for the next seven years, and development in
Duncanville ground to a halt.
The sequence over these seven years of unsuccessful Council
attempts to arrange housing that would provide for the demolition
of Topville reads like a bureaucratic nightmare- A plan for a
proposed Sharpeville Extension 1 was submitted by the Council to
the Native Affairs Department in April 1951 (3O). Two years later
it was returned to the Council so that it could be amended to
meet new Native Affairs Department requirements that all African
townships should be separated from European residential areas and
national roads by a 500 yard buffer zone of unused land (31).
The necessary amendments were dul y made, but the pi an coul d st i 11
not be approved because in the interim the Mentz Commission had
been appointed to plan all African housing in the PWV area (32).
When the Mentz Commission finally endorsed the plans in October
1955, Sharpeville Extension 1 could be proclaimed, but finance
still had to be arranged for housing in the new township- So,
November saw the submission of housing plans for Sharpeville
Extension 1 to the Native Housing Office, where they were
promptly rejected for failing to comply with certain technical
requirements as laid down in the Native Housing Comrnission's
Green Book (33). Revised plans that followed the requirements of
the Green Book to the letter were resubmitted to the Native
Housing Office but by the time they reached this office in March
1956 it had experienced a change of staff, and the new officials
had new objections to the plans (34). In desperation, the
Council sent a delegation in March 1957 to see the Minister of
Native Affairs about arranging funds for housing in Sharpeville
Extension 1- This finally had the desired effect- Verwoerd gave
the latest plans his approval (35), and after another year's
delay for them to be rubber stamped by the relevant authorities,
the Council was at long last able to complete the removals from
Topville.
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The delay in the construction o-f Sharpeville Extension 1 was to
have crucial e-f-fects on the events in Sharpeville that led up to
21st March 1960, but these are discussed later in the paper.
Here, I will only -focus on the tensions it gave rise to in
Council/employer relations.
African housing had always been the greatest issue of contention
between the Council and local industry. Initially, the Council
had re-fused to consider itsel-f responsible for providing
accomodation for the local black workforce. It was unwilling to
invest municipal funds in African housing which, it maintained,
should be the concern of employers. The large-scale nature of
production in Vereeniging meant that many companies could afford
this expense (36) while for some of those who could not, USCO was
prepared to make available sections of its own compound (37). By
the early 1940s, however, companies were beginning to run out of
compound space, as their labour forces increased in the war
induced boom. The lack of accornodation began to be a limiting
factor on the expansion of production and the Council came under
pressure from local industrialists to provide more African
housing.
The construction of Sharpeville temporarily resolved the problem,
but it resurfaced soon after the township's accomodation capacity
was reached early in 1951. Somewhat ineptly, the Council chose
this time to impose a licensing fee on compound accomodation.
The Iicensing fee elicited an unequivocally hostile response from
all local compounded industries and the Secretary of the
Association of Industrial Managers wrote an acerbic letter to the
Town Clerk:
A fair figure of the number of native workers housed in
industrial compounds is 8,000. Your Council will appreciate
that it is definitely in the Council's interests that the
members are prepared to arrange their own native
accomodation, and any suggestion that this number should be
housed under schemes controlled and financed by the Council
would cause embarassroent. It is suggested that the Council
should regard the number so housed as accomodated by the
employer companies at the Council *s tacit request and,
therefore, not subject to the licence under discussion
<3B).
There was not much in this letter that the Council could dispute
and it gladly took advantage of the advent of the Native Services
Levy the following year to abandon the licensing fee (39).
This eased much of the tension in relations between the Council
and the compounded industries but the seven-year del ay in the
construction of Sharpeville Extension 1 would place new strains
on these relations. For the bureaucratically imposed moratorium
on new housing schemes was accompanied by a Native Affairs
Department drive to remove all industrial compounds from white
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residential areas- Thus the Cpflil received strict orders -from
the Native Affairs Department not to allow any extensions to
existing compounds at a time when it was unable to offer
employers any Sharpeville accomodation for their workers <40). On
various occasions during the fifties the Council tried to point
out to the Native Affairs Department that departmental
intransigency on the issue of compounds was placing municipal
authorities in a compromising situation, but the Department
showed a remarkable insensitivity to their position. Thus the
Council was forced to tell USCO in 1953 <41), Houtkop Brickworks
in 1954 (42) and Vereeniging Brick and Tile Company in 1956 (43)
that the Native Affairs Department was not prepared to authorise
their applications to extend their compounds-
After the application of Houtkop Brickworks had been rejected the
Council offered to build houses in Sharpeville Extension 1 for
workers currently accomodated in compounds, if employers would
pay for the housing, but no employers volunteered (44). By 1956,
however, conditions in the USCD compound had deteriorated to such
an extent that USCO approached the Council once again with a
request to find space in Sharpeville for the company's married
quarters (45). the Council offered to let USCO build houses in
Sharpeville Extension 1 which would be paid for by the Council as
soon as loans from the Native Housing Commission came through,
but USCO could not afford this option as in 1956 they were
engaged in a heavy capital development programme (46)- With the
Council's consent they tried to raise a loan from ISCOR to cover
the costs of the housing (47), but when this was not forthcoming
all that the Council could offer USCO and the other compounded
industries was first choice on whatever houses remained in
Sharpeville Extension 1 after the residents of Topville had been
transferred to the township (4B). This turned out to be of no
use whatsoever, because the houses in Sharpeville Extension 1
were not even able to accomodate all the residents removed from
Topville, let alone any of the compounded workers, and the
problem of overcrowding in the compounds persisted well into the
sixties.
The Native Affairs Department's intransigence over compounds was
not simply the product of an urge for racial segregation, it was
part of a broader policy of attempting to reallocate labour in
the South African economy (49). In the early fifties, at least,
the Department was trying to stop the flow of migrant labour into
the urban areas and to restrict urban employment to workers with
permanent urban rights. Thus the Department could rationalise its
refusal to allow compound extensions even when no alternative
accomodation was available by arguing that Vereeniging companies
should be using labour drawn from the unemployed residents of
Sharpeville and channelled through the Vereeniging labour bureau
(50). This policy was motivated by the need to provide township
residents with jobs so that they could pay for the administration
of the new townships of the fifties and so that unemployment and
associated problems of social control could be kept to a minimum
(51)- But township administration and social control were not the
The Road to Sharpeville
immediate concerns of industrial ists, many o-f whom had powerful
material reasons for preferring to employ migrant labourers over
township residents. The Native Affairs Department anti-migrant
policy thus encountered strong resistance from employers on the
PWV. They refused to allow their workforces to be regulated by
the labour bureaux and privately continued to recruit migrant
labourers in defiance of influx control laws <52).
Right across the PWV, municipal authorities found themselves
caught between the Native Affairs Department that was insisting
on tighter influx control and the expansion of labour bureaux
authority over the allocation of labour/ and employers who
demanded the right to employ migrants if they so desired (53).
This conflict was particularly acute in Vereeniging, because the
relative size of the local migrant population was much larger
than in most other PWV municipalities. The Manager of
Non-European Affairs reported in 1953 that out a total male
workforce of 19 442 in Vereeniging, four manufacturing industries
that depended almost exclusively on migrant labour from
Basotholand and the Orange Free State Reserves employed 11 016
men (54); Tom Lodge cites figures from the 1960 census which
indicate that the Vereeniging migrant population'was as high as
15 000 (55).
This predominance of migrants in the Vereeniging workforce, was
partly a result of the unwillingness of local residents to work
under the unpleasant and dangerous conditions of local heavy
industry *
USCO had a boer mentality. The white supervisors didn't
care about safety... The Basothos could get adjusted to it
because they had mouths to feed back home but we youth
would look for a work with a bright future (56).
The local registering officer complained to the Top Location
Advisory Board in 1956 that "the board should educate the people
to realise the value of manual labour". The board tried to
comply with this request, but it clearly did not meet with a very
receptive audience. A resident recalled * "The work was too heavy
and the pay was too low... I could not stand being degraded in
this way" (57). Moreover, local industrialists had a preference
for employing migrants. Migrants were able to cultivate an image
of being more reliable and physically stronger than urban
Africans (58) and employers built up longstanding relationships
with groups of migrants from a particular district so that they
could recruit people who were recommended to them by workers whom
they trusted (59).
The "circle of labour", as this recruitment practise was referred
to by employers, provided the most common route taken by migrants
coming into Vereeniging. There were, however, other ways for
people to get into the municipal area. The farms in the
surrounding district provided a convenient staging post between
countryside and town. Labour hungry white farmers were more than
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willing to employ a migrant for a few months until he managed to
arrange a better job and/or accomodation in Vereeniging (60).
The farms were also used as a staging post for whole families*
that migrated- It was common practice for farmers to charge
families a rent in cash and in the labour of women and children
while the household head worked in Vereeniging (61).
Once within easy access of Vereeniging, migrants could look for
work at factory gates, or ask workers from their home district to
keep an eye out for any vancancies (62). It was even possible to
obtain documentation that made their search for work "legal".
Permanent residents regularly sold workseeking paspflo migrants
while contract labourers who did not intend returning to their
jobs would often send fellow countrymen in their place with their
papers (63), and advisory board members in the Top Location could
be bribed to arrange lodgers permits and passes (64). In any
event, the need for documentation was, at least until the late
1950s, not that, pressing. Migrants without papers could present
themselves at the Vereeniging labour bureau which was run by the
Council and would often be placed in jobs in the metal
industries. If the labour bureau had no record of available jobs
it would refer "illegal" migrants to the district labour bureau
to be allocated to farmers. However, as the bureau took no steps
to ensure that they duly presented themselves at the district
labour bureau, migrants could happily ignore the directive (65).
The failure of most "illegal" migrants to reach the district
labour bureau was the subject of a heated dispute between the
Council and the Native Commissioner. The Commissioner made
repeated requests to the Council to provide municipal police and
transport to ensure the arrival of all migrants referred to the
district labour bureau, but the Council refused to cooperate
(66). It was not prepared to run the risk of alienating local
industrialists by denying them a readily available pool of
migrant labour.
The Council still had to address the issue of local unemployment.
This it attempted to do with a variety of piece-meal measures.
It approached new companies setting up in the area individually
to request that they employ local people, and was able to record
a number of successes in this regard. These included the most
notable case of Raleigh Cycles who declared in 1951 that their
Duncanville factory would be worked exclusively by Vereeniging
residents (67). The Council also took measures to make the
employment of local youths mare attractive to industrialists.'It
offered to establish a pre-employment school so that "the
juveniles who were at present roaming the streets, could be
trained in the various branches of the industries, and by
inculcating upon them a sense of responsibility they might become
useful operatives" (68) and arranged a special dispensation from
the Department of Labour for the paying of sub-minimum wages to
local youths (69).
The Road to Sharpeville
But neither of these offers met with a positive response from
industry (70) and as youth unemployment increased steadily over
the decade, the Council started to reassess the stance it had'
taken between the Native Affairs Department and local employers.
The rise in unemployment had seen a proliferation in the
operations of youth gangs (71 ), and when this threat to the
Council's control over the townships was greatly aggravated in
1957 by an increased Russians' presence in Vereeniging < 72), the
Council started to clamp down on influx control. The tightening
up of influx control in Vereeniging took place at the same time
as the Top Location population was finally removed to
Sharpeville- These simultaneous processes were to provide a
crucial background to the Sharpeville shootings. I will return
to examine their effects, when I look at the background to the
shootings in some detail in later sections of this paper. Prior
to doing so, however, it is necessary to describe the conditions
that prevailed in Vereeniging' s townships in the fifties, and the
Town Council's system of administration of these townships.
THE TOWN COUNCIL AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF SHARPVILLE AND TOP
LOCATION.
The African population of Vereeniging in the '50s was housed in
the two starkly contrasting townships of Sharpeville and Top
Location. Sharpeville was a tightly control led township some
four kilometers outside Vereeniging- It was recognised by
parliament as the best administered township in the Union (73)
and was to become the prototype for all the planned townships
that were built in the 1950s.
Top Location, on the other hand, was an unregulated inner-city
township that had sprung up more-or-less against the will of the
Vereeninging Town Council in the 1920s and '30s. the Council's
rather short-sighted policy during the intei—war years of
refusing to take responsibility for providing accomodation for
Vereeniging's African residents meant that, by 1939, it had built
only 42 houses in Topville (74). As was shown in the previous
chapter, some companies could afford to house their labour force
- in 1937, 3898 out of an estimated 363B workers in the
Vereeniging area lived in industrial compounds <75) - but this
still left G07. of the urban workforce without acommodation
provided by industry or the local state. The result was a
proliferation of shacks in Top Location, and as the township
expanded at roughly the same rate as the development of industry
in Vereeniging - from 299 stands in 1923 to 419 in 1927, 621 in
1931 and 807 in 1937 (76) - it grew into an unregulated
shantytown.
It was primarily in an effort to increase its control over the
township population that the Council decided in 1941 to build
Sharpeville and to demolish Top Location. The need for greater
control had been thrown into relief by unrest in Topville in 1937
which had left two white policemen dead, but there were other
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•factors motivating the decision to remove the township. These
included the belated acceptance on the part of the Council of
industry's demands -for decent municipal housing -for the African
population of Vereeniging and the genuine concern of both
industry and the Council about sanitary conditions in Top
Location (7?). The latter were indeed alarming- In two months in
1946 out of a population of 15 000 there were 150 deaths of
pneumonia, 85 of gastro-enteritis and 24 of Tuber-colosis <7B).
Removals from Top Location started in 1343 and continued steadily
until 1951 when Council attempts to build alternative
accomodation for the remaining residents of Topville ran into the
bureaucratic obstacles described in the previous section. Thus a
Top Location that had been reduced to 426 stands (79) survived
through most of the '50s.
The population of Topville had always been riven by tensions
between landlords and tenants and this continued to be the case
through the '50s. The source of these tensions can be traced to
the Council's original housing policy, for the housing shortage
that it produced allowed for widespread rack—renting. On the 426
stands in Topville in 1351 there lived 1588 lodging families who
payed rent to a standholder (80). Shack rents were usually 15/-
per stand and each stand accomodated on average 21 people (81).
Standholders were able to make as much as $21 in rent each month
and were understandably reluctant to be removed to Sharpeville
where this source of income would no longer be available to them.
But a preference for 1iving in Top Location was not Iimited to
landlords. Top Location's municipal facilities included a
communal hall, a beerhall, a clinic, a Tubercolosis hospital,
football grounds and tennis courts (82). These were not on the
same scale as Sharpeville's, but they nevertheless compared
favourably with those of other contemporary townships and their
shortcomings relative to what was on offer at Sharpeville were
definitely not seen as sufficient reason to move. For Top
Location held many attractions over Sharpeville. It was not as
impersonal as Sharpeville; it was smaller and more neighbourly.
A member of the Sharpetowne Swingsters, a jazz band that came
from Topville, captured this in explaining how the band got
together1 "we knew each other because Top Location was not as big
as all the townships today... most of the families knew each
other" (83).
The greatest advantage of Topville to its inhabitants, however,
was that, compared to Sharpeville, it was practically free of
municipal control. The slumyards of Old Location could not be
patrolled as effectively as the neat rows of houses in
Sharpeville, and they provided shelter for gangs of unemployed
youths and for prostitutes and beer brewers who serviced the
nearby industrial compounds. Sporadic police raids served to
disrupt the activities of the Topville lumpenproletariat, but
they never seriously threatened its continued existence. Indeed a
substantial part of the Topville population managed to escape the
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attention o-f the municipal authorities altogether. In 1950 the
Manager o-f Non-European A-ffairs reported that he had encountered
a man who had been living in Topville for 37 years without a
lodger's permit (84) while the final removal of Topville revealed
the existence of hundreds of other people with similar histories
<B5).
Beyond this, life in Top Location was considerably cheaper than
in Sharpeville. Rack-renting in Top Location might have been
resented^ but many people preferred to pay 15/- per month for a
one-roomed shack in Topville than at first 27/- (86) and later as
much as $3.0.0 for a four-roomed house in Sharpeville (87). Top
Location was within easy walking distance of most parts of
Vereeniging, including all industrial areas. Thus its residents
had no transport expenses and did not have to deal with the
unsatisfactory bus service from Sharpeville to town (88).
Understandably, then, there was considerably resistance to the
removals. This resistance was initially sporadic - partly because
it was at first possible to avoid removal by moving to a stand
that was not scheduled for demolition. However, as the pace of
removals quickened towards the beginning of 1950 and the scope
for escaping removal narrowed, resistance increased. It reached a
peak in August 1950 when ten standholders and their tenants, led
by the popular Advisory Board member, Moses Sheshe, refused to be
removed (89). The resisters were ultimately ejected from
Topville, but only after Sheshe had taken the Council to the
Appelate Division- Sheshe himself refused to go to Sharpeville
and moved to Evaton when the Council finally demolished his home
in Topville (90).
Those residents that did go to Sharpeville found themselves
living in what was regarded by the Vereeniging municipality and
by the Native Affairs Department as a model township. From the
point of view of both facilities and control, Sharpeville was a
native administrator's dream. Sharpeville had six schools, nine
churches, two communal halls, a chiefs' resthouse, a beerhall, a
library and a creche (91). Its municipal sporting facilities
included a cycle track, five football fields, four tennis courts,
a boxing gymnasium and a stadium with seating for approximately
10 000 people (92). Its streets were lit and lined with over a
thousand fruit trees (93). It also boasted the best banking
facilities of any African township in the country with branches
of both the Standard Bank and the United Building Society (94).
These facilities can be explained partly in terms of the
Council's eagerness to maintain Sharpevilie's status as the best
township in the country. This was a source of great pride to the
Council and there are constant references to it in the minutes of
Council meetings (95). But the facilities were also part of a
more sophisticated approach to administration. The motivation
provided by the Manager of Non-European Affairs for the
construction of Sharpevilie's two communal halIs illustrates
this'
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If better recreational facilities could be provided for the
residents, they will have something to keep themselves
beneficially occupied and many complaints will disappear
and less offences will be committed (96).
In keeping with this approach, the Council showed more
sensitivity to local needs and grievances than most other
municipalities. It annually made available free beer and the use
of its stadium for Moshoeshoe Day celebrations which were
organised by residents of Sharpeville (97). It regularly donated
blankets to the township's indigent in winter OS) and when coal
supplies to Sharpeville ran low it held a meeting with
representatives of Amalgamated Collieries of South Africa to
arrange for the adequate provision of coal in the township (99).
Housing in Sharpeville had much in common with other facilities
in the township- Before work on the first Sharpeville housing
scheme began in 1943 the Council had, as we have seen, built
hardly any houses for the African population of Vereeniging.
When Sharpeville was completed in 1951, however. Council
officials were able to boast that they led the Union in terms of
both the cheapness of their African housing and the number of
houses they provided relative to the local African population
(100). Sharpeville's housing was also qualitatively better any
municipal African housing that had preceded it. The Vereeniging
municipality was exceptional in the way it paid at least some
attention to local needs when providing housing. On the strength
of a population survey that revealed a large number of families
with less than two children it decided to build one bedroomed
houses that could be let at a reduced rental in addition to the
standard two bedroomed houses (101) and as early as 1950 it had
provided electrical extensions to some part of Sharpeville in
response to requests from residents (102).
The Council were clearly sensitive to the link between housing
and social control. This sensitivity underpinned the project of
removing Top Location residents to Sharpeville and was
occasionally articulated in this regard (103). Its most explicit
formulation, however, came from the Vereeniging Convenor for
Housing of the National Council of Women, Mrs A Srnuts-Muller, a
women whose views on housing were shaped in close consultation
with officials of the Council *
Providing housing for non-Europeans is one of our very
urgent problems, and it is not absurd to say that the
menace of Communism and the liau Mau movement which has
brought Kenya to the brink of ruin can be stemmed here by
regarding housing as absolutely essential (104).
But just in case the odd Communist or stray forest fighter was
unmoved by the Sharpeville housing scheme, the Vereeniging Town
Council also took care to keep tight control over all political
activity in Sharpeville. It rigidly enforced the NAD regulations
The Road to Sharpeville 13
banning political groups -from the townships and prohibiting
meetings o-f more than ten people -from being held there (105).x In
1956 it withdrew the Advisory Boards o-f Sharpeville and Top
Location -from the South African Location Advisory Boards Congress
because the latter body had become "too political" (106) and it
generally attempted to censor all political life within the
townships- An indication of the extremes to which the Council
was prepared to go was that it would only allow Lever Brothers to
give cooking and washing demonstrations of new products in
Sharpeville on condition that the "company produce proof to the
satisfaction of the Manager., Non-European Affairs Department that
its employees do not belong to any undesirable organisation"
(107).
The Council was also quick to pre-empt any potential political
unrest. It responded to the May Day stayaway call of 1950 by
calling a joint session of both Advisory Boards at which the
District Commissioner of Police made it clear that any attempt at
a stayaway would be met by police violence. A message from the
Paramount Chief of Basutoland calling on people to go to work was
broadcast in the days leading up to May 1 and all meetings in the
townships were banned. On May Day a strong contingent of police
patrolled both townships and the stayaway was wholly unsuccessful
(10G). The June 26 stayaway later that year was dealt with in a
similar fashion and with identical results (103). Indeed/ the
Council were effectively able to insulate the Vereeniging
townships from the political turmoil that many other parts of the
country experienced in the '50s. Attempted recruitment for the
Defiance Campaign in Sharpeville was a total failure and all the
Freedom Volunteers that were arrested in Vereeniging came from
outside the district (110). There was no response whatsoever to
the Anti-Bantu Education Campaign and in 1958 the Assistant
native Commissioner observed of Vereeniging that "there were no
outbreaks of violence, boycotting or riots and when women in most
PWV towns were demonstrating against the issue of reference books













Fig. 1 Sources of Council Revenue (112)
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The considerable achievements o-f Vereeniging's Non-European
Affairs Department must be seen within the context of the success
of the municipal beerhalls in Sharpeville and Top Location, -for
it was this success that made effective administration of the
townships -financially viable (see Fig- 1). The Top Location
beerhall was built in the late 1930s but its first few years were
relatively inauspicious. In 1939 it was boycotted in a campaign
organised by women brewers and it ran at a *1329 loss- In 1942
it was still losing 4842 over the year and the Council seriously
considered closing it down before deciding that its losses was
worth underwriting in order to hamper the activities of illegal
brewers (113). The Sharpeville beerhall was initially built with
similarly unambitious hopes in mind, but over the '40s the
fortunes of the beerhalls improved and by the end of the decade
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Fig. 2 Average Hoitfcly leer Sales (115)
Then/ in 1950, three members of the Non-European Affairs
Department discovered a new recipe for brewing beer that produced
dramatic results- The new recipe was cheaper than its predecessor
and much more popular- It was introduced to the beerhalls in
March 1950 and beer profits shot up from $1870 over the period
October 1949 to February 1950 to *4420 over the next four months
(116). In the following years beer sales and profits continued
to rise dramatically (see fig 2 ) . Construction on a new brewery
in Sharpeville to meet the expanded demand for beer began in June
1950 (117). The most up-to-date malting equipment available was
bought for the brewery (118) and new Council posts were created
to take on a maltster and a second brewer (119). By 1953 the
Sharpeville brewery was being operated on round-the-clock shifts
and was producing more than any municipal brewery in the Union
other than those o? Durban and Johannesburg (120). Output
continued to expand until in 1959 it exceeded 2 million gallons
per year for the first time ever. By this stage the Council was
retailing beer at eight off-sales depots and two beerhalls and
was about to start supplying beer to the industrial compounds
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(121). The Council became acknowledged as the leaders in the
-field o-f municipal beer production. It was asked to supply beer
to the Vanderbijipark Health Committee and to the Kroonstad
Municipality (122) while the advice o-f the Manager o-f
Non-European Af-fairs on beer was sought by the municipalities o-f
Rand-fontein, Westonaria and Bethlehem and the Manager was invited
to deliver a paper on beer production to a conference organised
by the CSIR <123>.
Expanded beer sales provided the Council with a crucial source o-f
revenue. Section 13 of the Native Laws Amendment Act o-f 1952
eased the restrictions on the use o-f beer profits (124) and the
Council took advantage of this to balance its African housing
budget with *16 138 appropriated from the beer account (125).
Soaring beer profits enabled the Council to show a surplus on its
Native Revenue Account for the first time ever in 1954/55 (126)
and also financed the development of Sharpeville Extension 1.
The Chairman of the Finance and General Purposes Committee
reflected on the importance of beer revenue for African housing
in his introduction to the annual estimates in 1959= "There is no
doubt, that beer profits have saved the situation insofar as
Native sub-economic Housing is concerned" (127).
So by the late 1950s the Council seemed to have good reason to
feel satisfied with its Non-European Affairs Department,
Sharpeville was acnowledged as the best equipped and best
administered township in the country. Its beerhall continued to
record impressive profits and its population had proved itself to
be remarkably docile in a period where much of South Africa had
 (
witnessed a dramatic upsurge in African political activity. Top
Location continued to provide a source of uneasiness but its
removal seemed ultimately to be in sight.
The fifties had not been completely trouble-free - a number of
potentially explosive situations had developed but none of them
turned out to be unmanageable. Over a thousand people had
attended a protest meeting in 1951 against proposed stock
regulations which prohibited the keeping of cattle in the
townships (128) but when the Council had introduced the
regulations some three months later, it encountered no resistance
whatsoever (129). Complaints about police raids were made
repeatedly but the Council had grown to expect a certain degree
of residents' hostility to the police and the advisory boards'*
warning "that these raids would be the cause of large-scale
trouble eventually" (130) seemed a little exaggerated. the
Council had matters firmly under their control and "large-scale
trouble" appeared most unlikely. The atmosphere of the time was
recalled by a resident of Sharpeville:
There was nothing. Sharpeville, it was quiet all along..•
Sharpeville used to be quiet all along - there were no
problems in Sharpeville - that is why it was quiet in
Sharpeville for quite a long time (131),
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RENTS AND RAIDS
But beneath the calm exterior described in the previous section,
processes were at work that were to have a pro-found effect on the
political history of Sharpeville- One of these Mas the steady
rise of rents in the fifties (see Fig.l). The cost of providing
housing in Sharpeville was a heavy burden on the Council's
financial resources. As has been shown, some of this burden was
relieved by revenue from beer/ but beer profits alone were not
enough to cover the cost of housing. From 1952 the Council also
diverted funds from the Native Services Levy Account to the
Native Housing Account wherever this was possible (132) and in
1954 it decided to use black builders on all future housing
projects, in an effort to cut costs (133). Ultimately/ however/ a
significant proportion of the housing deficit had to be borne by
Sharpeville residents in the form of increased rents. In 1950 the
boast of the Manager of Non-European Affairs that SharpeviHe's
housing was the cheapest in the Union in addition to being the
best might have been tenable but as the decade progressed/ this
ceased to be the case.
The first rents in Sharpeville were 27/6 for a house without a
bathroom and 28/6 for a house with one (134). These rents
remained constant until 1952 but even before they started to rise
they were felt by the residents to be excessive (135). In the
years following 1952 they quickly became the major grievance of
the Sharpeville population. 1952 saw in Sharpeville the
beginnings of a nationwide trend to make township rentals
economic. The first annual income survey of Sharpeville was
carried out to assess the number of residents that qualified to
be transferred to economic rentals of $2.5.0 per month and on the
basis of its results 355 houses were converted to economic
rentals (135). The following year a further 79 houses were
converted (137) and in 1954 the Council made economic rentals the
norm. From then on tenants automatically paid economic rentals
unless they could provide proof that their income did not exceed
$15.0.0 per month (138). Later in 1954 a new sliding scale of
economic rentals was introduced on the recommendation of the
Native Affairs Department. Basic economic rentals now were
$2.0.0, $2.13-6, $2.14.6 or $3.0.0/ dependent upon what sort of
house was occupied, and for every 10/- greater than $15 per month
earned tjy a tenant, the rent increased by 3/- (139).
Simultaneously, the Council embarked on a massive rent drive
which enabled the Manager of Non-European Affairs to report in
August that $54 000 had been collected in Sharpeville in the
previous month and that there were no bad debts or irrecoverable
rentals in the township (140). Annual rent drives of this sort
characterised the Council's approach to the problem of financing
its housing schemes in the fifties. It was only in 1959 that
they displayed a more enlightened attitude1
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The strong movement which is afoot to improve the earnings
of our lowest paid workers is to be encouraged because .
sub-economic housing surely has no place in a well-balanced
economy <141 ).
But by this stage hostility to the Council's housing policy was
already far advanced. For as the decade progressed/ Sharpeville
had become seriously overcrowded. Thus residents felt that they
were paying steadily increasing rents for housing that was
becoming more and more inadequate- The original Sharpeville
housing scheme of 3163 houses was completed in 1951 (142) and
while the Native Affairs Department, National Housing Office/
Mentz Commission and Transvaal Provincial Administration
variously rejected Council proposals for additional housing
schemes, no building of African houses took place in Sharpeville
or, indeed, anywhere else in the Vereeniging area. The result was
that by 1956 repeated complaints about overcrowding were
filtering up through the Sharpeville Advisory Board (143). Nor
did the eventual construction of Sharpeville Extension 1 in 1958
improve the housing situation- All the new houses were occupied
by people removed from Top Location and even for this purpose
they proved inadequate. Thus many newly arrived families from
Topville found themselves sharing houses in Sharpeville (144) and
no houses at all were made available to relieve the congestion in
Sharpeville that had predated their arrival. The office of the
Manager of Non-European Affairs was inundated with complaints
from the Sharpeville Advisory Board about overcrowding in the
township and in exasperation he could only "rig 'n ernstige
versoek tot by die Adviserende Raad om 'n bietjie geduld te
gebruik" (145).
While the Sharpeville Advisory Board might still have been
prepared to show the Council some patience in 1958, the same
could not be said of the township's youth. Sharpeville's
population was overwhelmingly young' in 1960 it was composed of
8655 men, 6B43 women and 20863 children (146). The first
generation of youths born in Topville had reached the Vereeniging
job market towards the end of the 1940s only to discover that
their chances of finding employment were minimal. As was shown
below/ the major employers in the Vereeniging area were metal
industries which depended upon migrant labour and were highly
resistant to the notion of employing local youths. Large-scale
youth unemployment was attracting.the attention of the Council
from as early as 1951 (147). As the decade drew on, and the
number of youths entering the job market increased, unemployment
rose at an alarming rate. The situation was further aggravated
by a tendency among some of the larger industries - most notably
USCO and Stewarts and Lloyds - to increase the capital intensity
of their operations (148). Thus while USCO's production and
investment levels expanded steadily through the 50s, the total
number of workers employed by them peaked in 1952 and slowly
decreased over the next eight years (149).
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Years of unemployment produced a culture of recklessness and
resistance among the black youth of Vereeniging. A delegation of
industrialists complained to the Council in 1958 that they were
"concerned over the lack of a sense of responsibility in the
rising generation of non-European males who presented themselves
for employment". The delegation proceeded to complain about
"cheekiness" and "insubordination" on the part of African youths
(150). By all accounts the youth of Sharpeville and Top Location
seemed to be reckless in the factory. Informants have told me
that youths did not conceal their contempt for the "boer '
mentality" and that it was common practice for them to be
dismissed for assaulting their white supervisors (151).
Inside the townships this recklessness expressed itself in an
increase of the membership of youth gangs operating in both Top
Location and Sharpeville. Gang activities were focused on the
beerhalls. Gang members would congregate outside the halls
harrassing passers-by and flaunting taboos against.drinking beer
in public. This arrogance did not endear them much to the rest
of the township population. The Russians found them particularly
offensive and would regularly wage campaigns against them.
Petrus Tom explains:
Township gangs were very weak because they were not
national like Basotho gangs... If one Russian got assaulted
by tsotsis he could summon his gang and they would attack
any tsotsi in sight. Tsotsis were local gangsters and they
didn't have a chance against the Russians (152).
The hostility of the Russians to youth gangs was shared by the
advisory boards. Board members complained that the gangs'
practice of "drinking kafii—beer outside, in public was a shame
according to native custom" and that "it was disgraceful to see
it misused in this manner" (153). In response to board requests
boys younger than IS were banned from the beerhall (154) but gang
activities continued to flourish as unemployment and the youth
population increased over the decade. Gangs still operated from
the beerhalls (155) and now expanded their activities to include
the regular robbing of school pupils on buses and between the bus
terminus and Lekoa Shandu Secondary School in Top Location which
drew pupils from Sharpeville (156).
the Council initially attempted to combat the juvenile
delinquency through non-coercive means. It tried to promote
greater youth employment locally but its efforts met with little
support from industry. Industrialists were not interested in
employing youths, even at the reduced wage levels for which the
Council had obtained a special dispensation from the Department
of Labour. The Secretary of the Association of Industrial
Managers explained their feelings on this matter1
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The members o-f our Association feel that the employment of
native juveniles does not offer material advantages and.
that the lower wage rates are of secondary importance in
relation to the numerous advantages to be obtained by
employing adult natives (157),
A Council plan for pre-employment training for youths met with a
similar response from industry and had to be abandoned (158).
Without the assistance of employers, the Council could not hope
to strike at the root of the problem of juvenile delinquency -
unemployment. Its own youth employment projects - a township
vegetable garden (159) and vacation employment schemes (160) -
were obviously unable to absorb a significant proportion of the
total unemployed youth so it was forced to concentrate most of
its resources on combatting the activities of gangs- The first
step it took in this regard was to exert tighter control over the
Sharpeville cinema. The cinema was well patronised by gang
members who would identify with the villains in the films shown.
The Manager of Non-European Affairs called for Council censorship
of all films shown at Sharpeville in 1950. He explained the need
for this by quoting a remarkable extract from the report of the
commission of enquiry into the unrest in Krugersdorp,
Randfontein, Newclare and Newlands: "The mental capacity of the
audience is unable to grasp the fact that the hero succeeds in
the end and that crime does not pay" (161).
In the years that followed the Council took various other steps
to assist the gang audience in grasping this fact. They granted
the advisory boards greater powers to administer corporal
punishment to youths (162) and made the carrying of knives an
offence (163). They attempted to have a curfew imposed on all
African youths under Section 31 of the Urban Areas Act but were
told by the NAD that this was not possible (164). Then in 1958
the Non-European Affairs department launched a concerted attack
on the activities of gangs. The Manager declared that the
department had "decided to root out the tsotsi element" (165).
All suspected "tsotsis" were to be banned from the beerhalls and ,
depots, and expulsion to labour camps would be used "to prevent
unhealthy conditions such as in Johannesburg" (166). Thus in
1958, the beerhall regulations were amended to provide for easier
searches for weapons (167), an advisory board led vigilante group
was set up under the supervision of the Council to deal" with
gangs (168) and the. first large-scale expulsions of unemployed
youths from Vereeniging to the Native Affairs Department labour
camps began (169).
But by 195S, the Council had to deal with a much greater threat
to its control over the townships, because the previous year had
seen a dramatic increase in Russian gang activities in
Vereeniging. There had always been a Russian presence in
Sharpeville and Top Location. Vereeniging's compounded workforce
would visit the townships to go to stokvels, to see relatives or
to look for women (170), Top Location was a short walk from all
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the major compounds and it was easy -for workers to sneak through
the -fence at nights or over weekends (171). Sharpeville was
•further away, but gaining entry to it was even simpler as it was
unfenced until 1959 (172). Thus both townships were accessible
to the Russians but from 1950-57 neither witnessed much Russian
activity. In November 1949 the Manager of Non-European Affairs
complained about Russians coining "in lorries from as far as
Benoni to fight in Vereeniging and vice versa" <173) but over the
next seven years the Russians' presence in the Vaal appears to
have been concentrated in Evaton (174). Over this period there
were no major clashes involving Russians in Vereeniging and each
year the Mayor was able to compliment the Non-European Affairs
Committee and the advisory boards for yet another trouble-free
holiday season (175).
Then, towards the end of 195G, a tightly enforced visiting permit
system was introduced in Evaton and this prompted an exodus of
Russians to Sharpeville and Top Location (176). In the next few
months the advisory board minutes were filled with worried
references to the Russians. In February 1957, the Top Location
Advisory Board wrote a letter to the Non-European Affairs
Committee requesting them to do something about the "trouble at
the Beerhall because of the clash between two Basotho rival
gangs" (177) while a Sharpeville board member warned "that the
Township Chad} experienced many years of peace and tranquility,
but if people from the compounds have free ingres (sic) and
egress to the Township, trouble might result" (178). Both boards
urged that the regulations confining women to a special enclosure
in the beerhall be more strictly enforced as they "behave in an
unbecoming manner and are the cause of faction fights" (179).
When the manager was initially confronted by the advisory boards
with the need to control the Russians, he insisted that the
municipal police would be able to deal with the situation (180).
But while youth gangs might have found the threat of municipal
police action intimidating, the Russians clearly did not.
Thirty-six unarmed policemen (181) held no fears for veterans of
township gang battles "who could summon reinforcements from the
different compounds on the East and West Rand and as far,, afield
as Johannesburg" (182). Understandably, then, the municipal
police backed away from a direct confrontation with the Russians
and when a Sharpeville board member complained that the police
were doing nothing about the Russians because they were afraid,
the manager had to admit as much by conceding that the Russian
problem could only be directly tackled when the new Sharpeville
police station was completed (183).
In the meantime the Council tried to deal with the Russians by
indirect measures. It toyed with the idea of banning compound
dwellers from the townships but ultimately abandoned it in the
face of considerable advisory board opposition (184). Instead, it
decided to close the beerhall premises on Sundays. It would
remained possible to buy beer from the beerhall or off-sales
depots on Sunday, but not to drink it there. The Sharpeville
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board had asked for all Sunday beer sales to stop (185), but the
Council was unwilling to take so drastic a step -for -fear of the
loss of revenue it would involve and for the stimulus to illegal
brewing that it would provide (IBS). It did, however, enter into
negotiations with USCO with a view to directly supplying the USCO
compound with beer and thereby helping to stem the influx of
Russians into the townships on Sundays (187).
In addition to these measures, the Council started to tighten up
on the influx control of Basotholand nationals. Of all the steps
it took to counter the Russians, this was to have the most
significant consequences, but not necessarily in the direction
which the Council had hoped. Out of respect for the needs of
local industry, the Council had traditionally not strictly
enforced the influx control regulations that applied to
Basotholand migrants. By the raid-fifties, however, this was
beginning to change. The first signs of a new approach came in a
memorandum entitled "Buitelandse Naturelle - die probleem",
prepared by the Manager of Non-European Affairs in 1954=
Werkgeleentheid wat die Unie-naturelle op aanspraak kan
maak as deel van hul geboortereg, word hul ontneem deur die
duisende Buitelandse Naturelle. Hierdie feit kan nie
oorbeklemtoon word nie... Die insypeling moet gekeur word
en drastiese maatreels is hiervoor nodig. Dit help nie om
Buitelandse Naturelle te probeer beperk to sekere bedrywe
soos die landbou of mynwese nie. Hulle bly nie daar nie...
The memorandum proceeded to bewail the loss of spending power
that left the Union in migrant remittances and concluded with a
diatribe against foreign migrants that reached extraordinary
levels of invective5
Vergelding in sy nuwe omgewing kan hy maklik vryspring deur
eenvoudig uit te verdwyn. daar is niks in daardie nuwe
gebied wat horn bind soos b.v. f ami I iebande, eiendow of so
lets nie,.. Geen wonder dat die stamme van die Noord—
Transvaal na hulle verwys as muishonde nie. Die stank van
hulle seksuele losbandigheid sal nooit uit daardie.geweste
verdwyn nie want hul nalatenskap is talle buite-egtelike
kinders wie se versorging die gemeenskap te laste val
(18B).
The onslaught on Basotho nationals that this memorandum called
for was facilitated by amendments to the Urban Areas Act in 1955.
These amendments changed the status of Protectorate migrants to
that of prohibited immigrants. Workers from the Basotholand were
now only allowed to remain in an urban area if they were legally
present there on 6 May 1955. They were entitled to change Jobs
in the urban area, but they forfeited their urban rights if they
left an area for any purposes other than authorised vacational
leave (189). The amendments brought howls of protest from local
industry (190) but by 1958 they were being enforced. The
Director of Non-European Affairs explained why:
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Een van die oogmerke van die terugtrekking van die
voorbehoudsbepalings by Artikel 12 ( 1) Cof the Urban Areas
ActD is om 'n maklike manier te skep waarop die land van
ongewensde elements ontslae kan raak, soos byvoorbeeld die
wat onrus veroorsaak of aan gevegte deelneem as "Russians"
(191).
This situation presented residents of Sharpeville and Top
Location with a paradox. For while they would have been perfectly
happy to be rid of the Russians, they did not want tighter influx
control, still less the increase in police raids that came with
it. In the event, they lost out on all counts. The Russians were
not troubled by the municipal police and only left vereeniging
after the Sharpeville shootings; most of the early victims of the
tightening up of influx control were illegal relatives of
residents in possession of urban rights (192), and the late
fifties saw an intensification of police raids in the townships.
The Council's crackdown on youth gangs was more successful than
its attempt to limit the operations of the Russians, but in terms
of the response it produced from township residents, there was
not much difference between the two. The gangs were hardly
popular, but given the choice between reduced gang activities and
less police raids, most residents would have opted for the
latter.
Petrus Tom's description of a police raid helps to explain this:
The white S.A. Police reinforcements from Heidelberg would
be called. With .303 rifles they would surround the
location. Police in vans and on foot raided the location
from house to house. People hid under beds, in toilets,
inside wardrobes, and in dirty washing tubs. The raids
started as early as 1.00 am (193).
The raids were carried out with no respect whatsoever for the
possessions of residents- A lawyer representing the victim of a
raid wrote an angry letter to the Manager of Non-European Affairs
in which he commented on this1 "In conducting searches in the
houses, the methods of turning everything upside down and leaving
the house in a state of chaotic confusion cannot breed goodwill
towards the officials concerned" (194). There were repeated
complaints from advisory board members that arrests at raids were
made arbitrarily (195) and that people were pressurised into
paying admission of guilt fines against their will (196). These
were usually dismissed by the Council authorities on the grounds
that they should be made through the correct channels but
complaining about raids through the official channels was
impossible- Attempts to lodge a complaint with the Location
Superintendent encountered the response that he refused to "meet
with Kafirs or Kafirmeide" while letters to his office received
no reply (197)- It was clear to residents that, as far as the
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Council was concerned the police Mere free to do as they pleased
on raids and that the police had every intention of exploiting
this -freedom to the -full.
Thus the increase in police raids in towards the end of the 1950s
was the source of considerable discontent among township
residents. It placed an additional strain on a population that
already had to deal with ever-increasing rents and widespread
youth unemployment- It was in this context that the Council
undertook the final removal of the residents of Topville, and
their relocation in the Sharpeville Extension 1 housing and
site-and-service schemes.
CHAPTER 4
THE ROAD TO SHARPEVILLE
The Top Location Residents awaiting removal had an additional
reason to feel hostile towards the Council. Over the 1950s
conditions in Topville had steadily deteriorated and the Council
had done nothing to counter this trend. On the contrary their
administration of the township had actively encouraged it. As far
as the Council was concerned the continued existence of Top
Location was an anathema. Topville represented everything that
Sharpeville was not and for that alone the Council looked forward
to the day when it would finally be demolished, but there were
also sound financial reasons why the survival of Topville was
resented. Topville not only held up the expansion of
Duncanville, thus seriously obstructing the Council's long-term
development plans, it was also a direct drain on Council
finances. Unlike Sharpeville/ Top Location had never been able
to pay for its own administration, and its partial removal
aggravated this situation. The removal of half of the township's
population did not significantly cheapen its administration but
it halved the revenue accruing to the Council from stand rents
and beer sales. Thus by the 1954/5 financial year, the deficit
on the Old Location administration account was *5567 (198).
Under these circumstances, the Council was determined to cut
administration costs in Topville as much as possible and to
ensure that the enforced delay in the removal of the township did
not lead to developments that would make the removal process more
difficult to carry out. Thus Council services to Top Location
were cut down to a minimum. Rubbish removal took place only once
a week (199), the township's dirt roads were left to deteriorate
(200) and requests for more communal taps and for street lighting
were ignored (201). Schools in Top Location were shut down or
moved and by early 1951 all primary school pupils in the township
had to attend school in Sharpeville (202). The Lekoa Shandu
Secondary School remained in Topville through the fifties, but
only because the Bantu Education Department would not approve
Council plans for its removal to Sharpeville until 1959 (203).
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To limit the expansion o-f Topville while it awaited its
demolition, the Council placed a moratorium on all building in
the township. With no new houses allowed to be built and repairs
and extensions to existing houses banned Topville degenerated
into an appalling slum (204). Conditions had deteriorated so
badly by 1956 that a member o-f the Non-European Affairs Committee
insisted that residents o-f Topville at least be allowed to make
improvements to their own homes, but he was overruled by the rest
of the committee (205). The building ban was accompanied by a
•freeze on the issue of new lodgers permits. From 1950 no new
lodgers were allowed into the township, even if they had parents
living there (206). This had the effect of breaking up many
families, for there were a large number of parents in Topville
who had sent their children to live with relatives in the rural
areas only to find now that they would not be allowed to rejoin
them in the township in later years (207).
Top'ville residents thus had good reason to feel particularly
resentful of the intrusion of the municipal authorities into
their lives prior to their removal. The way in which this removal
was to be carried out was to aggravate their hostility to the
Council and to provide a crucial backdrop to the Sharpeville
shootings.
Permission from the central government for the establishnient of
Sharpeville Extension 1 was finally granted in 1957 (20S) and
after one last delay while the Council wrangled with Vereeniging
Estates over the rate at which compensation was to be paid for
the expropriation of land on which the new housing schemes were
to be built (209), no further obstacles to the removals remained,
the Council had waited for this opportunity since 1951 and it
moved ahead eagerly. It immediately applied for the Proclamation
of Duncanville Extensions 1 and 2 (210) and started to remove
people from Top Location at a furious rate. In October 195B the
population of Topville stood at 9763 (211). By August of the
following year it had been completely evacuated (212).
To sustain this pace, the removals had to be carried out-without
any consultation with the people who were being removed.
Residents were simply given the number of their new house in
Sharpeville. Stands in Topville were demolished row by row, so
people had an approximate idea of when their turn to be removed
would come, but no more than that (213). Petrus Tom describes his
family's experience of removal:
There was a truck doing the removals which was paid for by
the Municipality. We had lunch at twelve o'clock and then
found that all our belongings were no longer there. They'd
already moved them to Sharpeville. We'd got a number in
Sharpeville but we didn't know Sharpeville very well.--
Cso] we didn't know where to look for our number. I asked
some people who gave me directions. We spent one or two
hours looking for our new home. The next, day one stil I got
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lost because one was not used to the place- It took us
about two weeks to learn how to get home, where to get off
the bus and where to board the bus to town- We did not use
buses in Top Location. We used bicycles or simply walked
because Top Location was next to the -factories (214).
Petrus Tom's -family moved into a house in Sharpeville Extension 1
but most of the -former residents of Topville were removed to
stands in the site and service scheme. Site and service schemes
had their origin in the Native A-f-fairs Department's need to
provide cheap municipal housing for the squatter populations that
had sprung up on the PWV in the 30s and 40s (215). The principle
that underpinned them was that it would be significantly cheaper
and quicker to allow Africans to build their own houses according
to approved plans, than it would be to build these houses for
them. Residents of a site and service scheme were provided with
a stand which on which there was a temporary housing structure
and a toilet. Cheap building materials were made available to
them and they were expected to have built a house after at most
five years, failing which they would lose their rights to remain
on the stand (21£). While some case could possibly be made for
the removal of squatter communities to site and service schemes,
there was very little that could be said in favour of removing
residents from a settled municipal township like Topville onto
stands that contained nothing more than a single roomed shack and
a toilet. The Vereeniging Medical Officer of Health pointed this
out in a letter to the town Clerk about the proposed site and
service scheme'
The site-and-service scheme, the way I understand it, has
been primarily established to solve the native squatting
problem. As there is no real squatting problem as such in
Vereeniging, I cannot for the life of me see that a
site-and-service scheme could in any way improve matters
for the present residents of Top Location. An undertaking
was given the residents of Municipal Location that they
would eventually be moved to similar houses Cto those]
which are at present occupied in Sharpeville, and to now
transfer these people to a site-and-service schemeawould in
my opinion be a serious breach of faith with the community
concerned (217)
The Council, however, could see no alternative to this breach of
faith. The Native Affairs Department had made it clear in 1954
that at least for the forseeable future, a site-and-service
scheme was a precondition to their approval of any new housing
schemes in Vereeniging (218) and the Council urgently needed to
remove Topville. Initially it tried to make the site-and-service
scheme less offensive than others on the PWV by applying for
enough funds to provide larger than average and more durable huts
(219) but its efforts in this regard were vetoed by the Native
Affairs Department- A request for $32 500 for 500 huts was
rejected by the department on the grounds that it was unnecessary
to spend more than $35 on a hut (220)- So residents removed to
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the site-and-service scheme had to make do with the standard
huts- To aggravate matters, loans -for building materials which
the Council had promised were only made available after the Bantu
Housing Office had spent the better part of two years processing
the Council's application -for funds (221). People who were
prepared to finance their building without Council loans found
that it took months for their plans to be approved (222), and in
any event, with only one communal tap for every thirty stands,
there was not enough water to meet the residents' daily living
requirements, let alone to build with (223). On top of this all,
the roads in the site-and-service scheme were inadequate and many
of the huts would not lock properly- Moreover, for occupying one
of these huts, people had to pay $1.15 (224) - over twice as much
as average rents in Topville (225)- It is understandable, then,
that the PAC would receive a particularly good response from the
site-and-service scheme residents (226).
Conditions in the housing scheme in Sharpeville Extension 1 were
considerably better than those in the site-and-service scheme but
they were nevertheless the source of much dissatisfaction. 270
of the 644 houses in Extension 1 were shared by two families
(227). the Council maintained that this was only done to enable
poorer families to pay rents that they would otherwise not have
been able to afford (228), but in actual fact, it was because
there was not enough housing for all the people removed from
Topville. The number of complaints from the Sharpeville Advisory
Board about overcrowding in the township left the Manager of
Non-European Affairs in a state of exasperation (229), but many
residents had long despaired of working through the advisory
board channels and were seeking alternative ways of concentrating
the attention of the Council on the housing shortage in
Sharpeville- In May 1953 a group entitling themselves "The New
Arrivals from Topville" wrote a letter to the Secretary for
Native Affairs requesting "that if there is insufficient houses
(sic) to accomodate the residents of Topville, it Cbe considered]
the responsibility of the Town Council to get them accomodated
elsewhere" (230). The next month over 200 people met to protest
about overcrowding and high rentals, and a deputation was elected
to convey their complaints to the Council (231).
The Director of Non-European Affairs claimed never to have heard
from the deputation and denied that there were any complaints
about the housing in Sharpeville Extension 1 (232). This was
symptomatic of a general tendency on the part of the Council to
ignore all signs of African dissatisfaction (233). Thus the mayor
could jubilantly report at the end of 1959=
Die noodsaaklikheid vir beter behuisingsomstandighede vir
die inwoners van die Ou Lokasie, wat alreeds in 1941 besef
is, het nou 'n voldonge feit geword (234).
But this claim must have sounded a little hollow when popular
antipathy to the site-and-service scheme had forced the
resignation of the Chairman of the Sharpeville Advisory Board,
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Blockman Kolisang, a man who, in ten years of service on the
board had displayed a remarkable capacity for ignoring the
sentiments o-f the township's residents (235), and when only two
months previously the Manager of Non-European Affairs had
reported that over 2000 of the inwoners had chosen to leave the
urban area for Lesotho, Gwa-Qwa and Evaton rather than to avail
themselves of the beter behuisingsomstandighede (236). In fact,
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people who left the Vereeniging municipal district. A more
realistic figure would be 5000, as Lodge has shown (238). (The
dramatic drop in population over 1958/59 can be seen in fig. 3).
To many residents it must have seemed that the people who left
Vereeniging in 1959 had made the correct choice. The removals
were accompanied by new Council attempts to assert municipal
control over township life. Over the course of 1959 the Council
began systematically to enforce stock regulations that were
introduced in 1956, but had previously been ignored by residents
without any Council response (239). The regulations banned
private stabling of stock. All draught animals were now to be
kept at the municipal stables. Stock owners were fiercely
opposed to this partly because of the extra expense that it
involved - stable rents were to cost 6/6 per month (240) - but
also because municipal stabling was inadequate. The stables were
not large enough for horses and they offered inadequate
protection from the elements (241). These objections, however,
were dismissed by the Council and the regulations were rigidly
enforced as soon as construction work on the stables was
completed in October 1959 (242).
The same month witnessed another ominous development for the
Sharpeville population - on 23 October the Sharpeville Police
Station was opened by the Minister of Bantu Administration and
Development, MC de Wet Nel (243), The Sharpeville Commission of
Enquiry would later report that
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Die getuienis dui daarop dat voor die gebeure wat in
hierdie verslag ter sprake is, daar 'n goeie gesindheid
tussen die Polisie te Sharpeville en die inwoners bestaan
het <244).
This conclusion seems highly unlikely, to say the least. But even
if one accepts it one can see that the opening of the police
station would have intensified pre-existing grievances about
raids. The 3 white and 35 black SAP members who staffed the new
police station (245) freed the municipal police from all their
previous responsibilities other than raids. The municipal police
could now ignore criminal activities in the township and
concentrate their energies on turning residents' houses upside
down in the search for illegally brewed beer and people without
the necessary documentation.
In addition to tighter Council control over Sharpeville,
residents had to deal with sharp increases in the cost of living.
Over the course of 1959 bus fares, which were already an
additional expense for erstwhile Topville residents, doubled
(246). Ultimately, however, the greatest drain on residents'
incomes came from rent. The outgoing mayor reported at the end
of 1959
The time has arrived when the impact of expenditure on both
non-productive capital works, and those capital works which
have not yet reached their maximum stage of productiviity,
is making itself felt on the finances of the Council. The
result is that the Council has had to defer some of its
cultural and amenity projects for the time being, and allow
only such expenditure as is necessary for, and compatible
with the growth, expansion and improvement of the town and
the prestige which it enjoys as the premier industrial
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The suspension of municipal cultural and amenity projects was not
a grave concern o-f the Sharpeville residents but the drive to,
balance arrears that accompanied the mayor's statement/ most
definitely was (see Fig- 4). In November 1959 1500 rent notices
were served on Sharpoville households (249) and by January I960,
the corresponding figure had risen to 2310 (250). Early in Mar-ch
The Star reported that 300 women protesting about rents had
marched to the Location Superintendant's office and stoned his
car (251). At the next Non-European Affairs Committee meeting,
the manager "contested that more than ninety percent of the
report was false". He claimed that the protest was the product
of ANC and PAC intimidation, that it had involved less than
seventy people, and had quickly dispersed without any stone
throwing. He further reported that the mayor was going to take
up the matter of the report with The Star and would issue a
statement at the next Council meeting (252). However, this
confidence was belied by the manager's admission later in the
meeting "that the position in Sharpeville was crucial and that
further trouble was brewing". He urged the Council to meet with
government authorities immediately so that'a reduced sliding
scale of rents could be introduced in Sharpeville and that
government funding could be arranged to finance the deficit this
would produce (253). The proposed meeting never took place. For
by the time the manager made his call, an incredibly strong PAC
anti-pass campaign had tieen organised in Sharpeville and March 21
was only a week away.
PAC activists had come to Sharpeville from Johannesburg in the
middle of 1959. A local branch was set up in July and by the time
of the shootings its membership had grown to 150 people (254).
The PAC's organisational style was low key but rigorous. Prior to
21 March it did not arrange any large public meetings, but relied
on intensive personal canvassing (255)' "PAC members would
address us at lunchtimes, in the buses, and in the township. They
were campaigning everywhere," a resident remembered (256). PAC
activists were able to provide local grievances with a political
coordinating principle, albeit a crude one. Sharpevilie's youth
<257) and the residents of the site-and-service scheme (258) were
particularly receptive to the organisation's rhetoric, and with
the support of these two constituencies, the PAC anti-pass
campaign gathered momentum quickly. Petrus Tom recalls'
It was the strongest campaign I've ever seen... You
couldn't go and drink at any of the stokvels with a pass or
without a sticker showing you were supporting the
campaign... This thing was very very hot. Everybody was
prepared (259).
On the night of Sunday 20 March, the telephone lines from
Sharpeville to Vereeniging were cut and groups of youths went
from house to house through the township warning people not to go
to work in the morning (260). The stage was set for the biggest
political event in Vereeniging's history.
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POSTSCRIPT
The events of 21 March 1960 have been extensively chronicled x
elsewhere <2fil) and need not be recounted here but a few words .
about their effect on the Council are in order- The shootings
left the Council in a state of shock and disbelief. It could not
bring itself to confront what had taken place on March 21st- The
only reference to the shootings in the first meeting that
followed them concerned the donation of *200 of Council funds to
a relief fund for the dependents of victims (262). In subsequent
meetings the subject of the shootings was avoided completely.
However, at a less public level the shootings clearly had a
considerable effect on the thinking of Council officials. For
the annual estimates in July I960 revealed trends towards
significant shifts in the Council's policy with respect to the
Sharpeville population. Introducing the estimates, the Finance
and General Purposes Committee Chairman, JJ van Eeden gave a
speech that would have been unthinkable six months earlier:
The total inadequacy of native wages is a matter that can
no longer be ignored. It is common knowledge that wages for
unskilled labour are less than half of a bare subsistence
wage; that is to say they are half way between complete
destitution and the breadline- To say that higher pay must
go hand in hand with increased productivity is begging the
question1 a man cannot increase his output if he is hungry,
cold and miserable. Government policy is that the Bantu
must pay for his housing, schools and other so—called
amenities in the urban areas- It is also said that rent
should be no more than one fifth of income, but no attempt
is made to lay down officially what income a man should
earn to enable him to pay an economic rent and to have
enough over to provide himself and his family with food,
clothes, education and the minor luxuries of an urban
existence... It is said that natives spend $1 million a
day in South Africa- The sub-economic wage is then surely
short-sighted and inexplicable, because a bare subsistence
wage would double this opending (sic) power and the country
is sorely in need of some such stimulus to restore
prosperity (263).
The estimates themselves provided for a minimum of 20% wage
increases to all African employees of the Council, the creation
of more municipal clerical posts for Africans and a slight
reduction of rents. They were followed by a meeting between the
Council and local industrialists at which van Eeden managed to
obtain a commitment from employers to match the Council's 20%
wage increases (264)- Thus the Sharpeville shootings heralded
the end of an era in township administration in Vereeniging. In
the years that followed a more enlightened approach of people
like van Eeden became the norm- This shift, effected in the
decade of consolidation of the Apartheid state would, in turn,
create new contradictions and provide new areas of confIict
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between the African population of Vereeniging and the municipal







There was an ANC branch in Sharpevilie/Top Location with
over 200 members by 1956. However/ it was remarkably
inactive. The only ANC campaign that was taken up locally
was the potato boycott. Apart from this the activities of
the branch seem to have been limited to collecting
membership subscriptions and taking members to ANC meetings
in Sophiatown, Orlando, Evaton and Pimville. (Interview with
Mr Simanga, 6 September 1986; Interview with P. Thapeli, 30
August 1986).
See E. Roux, Time Longer than Rope. Madison1 University of
Wisconsin Press, 1966; A. Reeves, Shootings at Sharpeville.
London • Victor Gollancz, I960; M. Benson, South Africa1 the
Struggle for a Birthright- Harmondsworth» Penguin, 1969. A
notable exception to this rule is provided by Tom Lodge
whose Black Politics in South Africa since 1945 provides an
examination of developments in Vereeniging in the 1950s that
is remarkably sensitive for a study of that scale. See
Black Politics in South Africa. Johannesburg! Ravan, 1983,
pp.205-9.
My treatment of the PAC in this paper is extremely cursory.
This is not an attempt to underplay the role of the
organisation in the events of 21 March; rather it is a
shortcoming of the paper that I am in the process of
rectifying through interviewing ex-PAC people in
Sharpeville.
T. Oosterbroek (ed), Vaal River Complex - Industrial Growth
Point of the Eighties. Johannesburg: Thompson Publications,
1983.
Oosterbroek, Vaal River Complex, p.67.
T. Shakinovsky, *The Local State in Crisis: the Shaping of
the Black Working Class, Vereeniging 1939-1949* , B.A. (Hons)
Dissertation, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg,
1984.
7. Oosterbroek, Vaal River Complex, p.23.
B. Shakinovsky, *The Local State', p.16.
9. Town Council of Vereeniging, meeting of 28 October 1959,
Mayoral Minute for Year Ending October 1959.















V.A. 100 May 192. Town Clerk of Vereeniging. Letter to
Receiver o-f Revenue, Vereeniging, 11 November 1953.
D- Gilfoyle, *An Urban Crisis1 The Town Council/ Industry
and the Black Working Class in Springs, 1948-58'. B.A.
(Hons) Dissertation. University of the Witwatersrand,
Johannesburg^ 1983, p.14.
Oosterbroek, Vaal River Complex, p.25.
Town Council o-f Vereeniging, meeting o-f 25 October 1951.
Mayoral Minute for the Year Ending October 1951.
Oosterbroek, Vaal River Complex. p.36.
Town Council o-f Vereeniging, meeting of 31 October 1952.
Mayoral Minute for the Year Ending October 1952.
Town Council of Vereeniging, meeting of 26 August 1952.
Report of the Finance and General Purposes Committee for
August 1952. The free provision of railway sidings on
industrial stands was only possible because the Council
could find buyers for its industrial stands at prices high
enough to cover the cost of sidings. In most other towns on
the PWV, this was not the case, and municipalities could not
afford to offer sidings as an industrial service.
Town Council Df Vereeniging, meeting of 22 May 1952. Report
of the Finance and General Purposes Committee for May 1952.
Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 3 March 1950.
Report of the Town Clerk
V.A. 190/7. Town Secretary of Vereeniging. Minutes of the
Sale of Land and Industrial Development Committee, 13 June
1960.
See V.A. 100/4 vol.2. Correspondence between Town Clerk of
Vereeniging and USCO, Vereeniging and District Chamber of
Industries, Vereeniging Chamber of Commerce and Vereeniging
Afrikaanse Sakekamer.
Town Council of Vereeniging, meeting of 26 November 1953.
Report of the Sale of Land and Industrial Development
Committee for November 1953
Town Council of Vereeniging, meeting of 2B January 1959.
Report of the Town Clerk.
Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 14 July 1950.
Minutes of Old Location Advisory Board meeting held on 26
May 1950-
The Road to Sharpeville 33
24. V.A. 100/5/2, Town Clerk of Vereeniging. Letter to Receiver
of Revenue, Vereen iging, 11 November 1953.
25. See V.A. 190/7. Correspondence between Town Clerk o-f
Vereeniging and Administrator o-f the Transvaal and Surveyor
General between 19 January 1950 and 27 November 1951.
26. See V.A. 190/7. Correspondence between Town Clerk o-f
Vereeniging and Babcock and Wilcox Corporation, Raleigh
Cycles, Irvine Chapman between 27 March 1950 and 15 February
1952.
27. See Town Council o-f Vereeniging, meeting of 30 July 1957.
Report of the Finance and General Purposes Committee.
28. See Shakinovsky, 'The Local State'.
29. Non-European A-f-fairs Committee, meeting of 10 May 1951.
Report of the Town Clerk.
30. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 12 April 1951.
Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs.
31. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 8 May 1953.
Report of the Town Clerk.
32. Public Health, Licensing and Non-European Affairs Committee,
meeting of 17 November 1953. Report of the Manager of
Non-European Affairs.
33. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 15 November 1955.
Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs.
34. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 3 May 1956.
Report of the Town Clerk.
35. Town Council of Vereeniging, meeting of 28 May 1957.
Report of the Finance and General Purposes Committee.
36. Shakinovsky, *The Local State', p.20.
37. Shakinovsky, *The Local State', pp.36-8.
38. V.A- 130/4 vol. Secretary of the Association of Industrial
Managers of Vereeniging. Letter to the Town Clerk, 13 July
1951.
39. Town Council of Vereeniging, meeting of 26 August 1952.
Report of the Non-European Affairs committee for August
1952, The Native Services Levy was a levy imposed by the
central government on employers in 1952. It was seen as a
temporary measure that was needed to finance the provision
of essential services (water, sanitation, lighting and
The Road to Sharpeville 34
roads) that would make possible the establishment of
townships on an economic basis. The levy was later used to
finance site and service housing schemes as well. See J.
Matthewson, The Establishment of an Urban Bantu Township.
Pretoria- J.L. van Schaik Ltd, 1957, pp.111-13.
40. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 5 June 1953.
Report of the Town Clerk.
41. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 5 June 1953.
Report of the Town Clerk.
42. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 5 July 1954.
Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs.
43. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 14 February 1956.
Report of the Town Clerk.
44. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 5 October 1954.
Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs.
45. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 14 February 1956.
Report of the Town Clerk.
46. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 12 July 1956.
Report of the Town Clerk.
47. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 11 October 1956.
Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs.
48. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 5 July 1957.
Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs.
49. See D. Hindson, *The Pass System and the Formation of an
Urban African Proletariat in South Africa1 a Critique of the
Cheap Labour Power Thesis', Ph.D Thesis, University of
Sussex, 19B3.
50. See Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 5 July 1954.
Report of the Town Clerk.
51. See Public Health, Licensing and Non-European Affairs
Committee, meeting of 8 February 1354. Report of the Manager
of Non-European Affairs.
52. D. Posel, ^Providing for the Legitimate Labour Requirements
of Employers', paper presented to the African Studies
Seminar, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 29
October 1984. This point is worth stressing because it
contradicts much of the original revisionist literature on
the early years of apartheid which argued that apartheid was
devised as a system to provide for the survival of urban
migrancy after the subsistence base of reserve production
The Road to Sharpeville 35
had been destroyed. Ci. H. Wolpe, ^Capitalism and Cheap
Labour Power in South Africa' From Segregation to Apartheid'
in Economy and Society, vol.1, no.5, 1972.
53. See Posel ^Providing for the Legitimate Labour Requirements
of Employers'.
54. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 10 April 1953.
Report of the Town Clerk.
55. Lodge, Black Politics, p.207.
56. Interview with P. Thapeli, 27 August 1986. See also
Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 12 August 1958.
Report of the Town Clerk.
57. Interview with G. Mabinetsa, 30 August 1986. See also
Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 13 August 1956.
Minutes of Old Location Advisory Board meeting held on 25
July 1956.
Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 12 July 1955.
Report of the Town Clerk.
Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 15 August 1955.
Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs.
Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 7 September 1950.
Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs.
V-A. 130/2 vol. S.J. Parsons. Letter to Secretary of Native
Affairs, 7 July 1945.
Interview with *Z'. It appears that all over the FwV,
peri-urban farms and smallholdings were used by migrants as
a staging post to the towns. What distinguished Vereeniging
from other PWV towns was that municipal attempts to evict
*s^uatters' from mearby farms met with strong opposition
from white farmers who valued their African tenants highly.
See V.A. 130/2 vol. S.J. Parsons. Letter to Secretary of
Native Affairs, 7 July 1945. Cf. P. Bonner *"Siyawughoba,
Siyawugebhula Umhlaba ka Maspala" E"We are Digging, Me are
Seizing Great Chunks of the Municipality's Land"] Popular
Struggles in Benoni, 1944-1952'. Paper presented to the
African Studies Seminar, University of the Witwatersrand,
Johannesburg, October 1985, pp.18-19.
63. Shakinovsky, *The Local State'. p.51.
64. V.A. 130/2 vol. Manager of Non-European Affairs. Letter to
Town Clerk, 28 July 1950.
65. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 11 June 1956.






The Road to Sharpeville 36
66. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 10 September 1956
Report of the Town Clerk.
67. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 10 May 1951.
Minutes of Sharpeville Advisory Board meeting held on 26
April 1951. The agreement of Raleigh to employ local
residents must be seen within the context of their need for
a stable workforce. They were exceptional among local
industries in that their production process called for some
semi-skilled labour. They therefore could not have afforded
the high turnover of migrant labour that most heavy metal
industries operated with.
68. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 12 August 1958.
Report of the Town Clerk,
69. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 11 August 1953.
Report of the Town Clerk.
70. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 9 March 1959.
Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs and Non-
European Affairs Committee, meeting of 12 October 1953.
Report of the Manager of Non—European Affairs.
71. See ch.3 below.
72. See ch.3 below. The Russians were a gang of Basotho migrants
that dominated the PWV in the 1950s. For the fullest
published examination of their activities see J. Guy and
M. Thabane, *The Ma-Rashea- a Participant's account'. Paper
presented to the History Workshop, University of the Wit-
watersrand, 1984.
73. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 1 December 1949,
Minutes of Sharpeville Advisory Board meeting held on 17
November 1949.
74. Shakinovsky, *The Local State in Crisis'- By way of
comparison, the Springs Town Council had, by the same year/
built 561 houses and a block of 48 municipal rooms in
Payneville. See Gilfoyle, *An Urban Crisis'.
75. Shakinovsky, vThe Local State in Crisis', p.20.
76. Shakinovsky, *The Local State in Crisis', p.19.
77. Shakinovsky, *The Local State in Crisis', pp.36-8. See also
Mayoral Minute for year ending October 1959, Town Council of
Vereeniging, meeting of 28 October 1959.
78. Lodge, Black Politics, pp.205-6. *
The Road to Sharpeville , 37
79. Non-European Af-fairs Committee, meeting of 16 January 1951.
Report o-f the Manager of Non-European Affairs.
80. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 16 January 1951.
Report of the Town Clerk.
81. Lodge, Black Politics, p.206.
82. P. Tom, My Life Struggle, Johannesburg: Ravan and Fosatu,
1985, p.6.
83. Transcript of an interview with The Sharpetown Swingsters
conducted by Ian Jeffrey, 22 January 1985.
84- Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 14 November 1950.
Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs.
85. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 10 August 1959.
Minutes of Old Location Advisory Board meeting held on 28
July 1959.
B6. Lodge, Black Politics, p.206.
B7. Public Health, Licensing and Non-European Affairs Committee,
meeting of 8 February 1954. Report of the Manager of
Non-European Affairs.
88. Tom, My Life Struggle, p.23.
89. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 7 September 1950.
90. Tom, My Life Struggle, p.21.
91. V.A. 130/15. Town Clerk of Vereeniging. Letter to Native
Commissioner, 16 September 1957; Non-European Affairs
Committee, meeting of 11 February 1956
92. V.A. 130/6- Union of South Africa, Department of Native
Affairs, Native (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, No 25 of
1945- Questionnaire to be completed in respect of the Urban
Area of Vereeniging - Sharpeville, 1957; Non-European
Affairs Committee, meeting of 6 December 1954.
93. Public Health, Licensing and Non-European Affairs Committee,
meeting of 11 January 1954 Report of the Town Clerk;
Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 7 September 1950.
Minutes of Sharpeville Advisory Board meeting held on 24
August 1950.
94. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 13 June 1955;
Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs. Non-European
Affairs Committee, meeting of 13 October 1958. Report of the
Manager of Non-European Affairs.
The Road to Sharpevil le
95- See for example Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 1
December 1949. Minutes of Sharpeville Advisory Board meeting
held on 17 November 1949; Non-European Affairs Committee,
meeting of 11 September 1955 Report of the Town Clerki Town
Council of Vereeniging, meeting of 28 October 1959- Mayoral
Minute for year ending October 1959.
96. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 11 May 1950.
Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs.
97. See for example Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of
10 March 1950. Report of the Manager of Non-European
Affairs.
98. See for example Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of
11 June 1951. Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs.
99. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 11 June 1956.
Report of the Town Clerk.
100. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 15 November 1951.
Minutes of Sharpeville Advisory Board meeting held on 24
October 1951-
101 Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 11 May 1960.
Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs.
102. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 11 June 1950,
Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs.
103- See for example Town Council of Vereeniging, meeting of 28
October 1959. Mayoral Minute for the Year Ending October
1959.
104. *SA will Need 350,000 Native Houses in 10 Years'/
Vereeniging News, 19 January 1954.
105. Town Council of Vereeniging, meeting of 15 December*.1952.
Report of the Finance and General Purposes Committee.
Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 13 August 1956.
Report of the Town Clerk.
106- Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 11 October 1956.
Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs.
107. Public Health, Licensing and Non-European Affairs Committee,
meeting of 8 February 1954. Report of the Manager of
Non-European Affairs.
10B- Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 11 May 1950.
Minutes of Sharpeville Advisory Board meeting held on 25
April 1950; Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 11
May 1950- Report of the Town Clerk.
The Road to Sharpeville 39
103, Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 14 July 1950.,
Report o-f the Manager of Non-European A-f-fairs.
110. Non-European A-f-fairs Committee, meeting of 2 December 1952.
Minutes of Sharpeville Advisory Board meeting held on 26
November 1952.
111. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 9 June 1958.
Minutes of Sharpeville Advisory Board meeting held on 26 May
1958.
112. Source' Minutes of the Non-European Affairs Committe,
meetings from 14 November 1949 to 8 February 1960. Monthly
Reports of the Manger of Non-European Affairs. ( "Passes'
refers to registration of saervice contract fees; *Levy'
refers to the Native Services Levy)
113. Shakinovsky, *The Local State in Crisis*1, p.53.
114- Public Health, Licensing and Non-European Affairs Committee,
meeting of 17 November 1953. Report of the Town Clerk,
115. Source1 Minutes of the Non-European Affairs Committe,
meetings from 14 November 1949 to 8 February 1960. Monthly
Reports of the Manger of Non-European Affairs.
116. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 7 September 1950.
Report of the Town Clerk.
117. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 9 June 1350-
Report of the Town Clerk.
118. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 11 September
1951. Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs-
119. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 11 November 1952.
Report of the Town Clerk; Non-European Affairs Committee,
meeting of 5 April 1955. Report of the Manager of .
Non-European Affairs-
120. Town Council of Vereeniging, meeting of 28 April 1953.
Report of the Finance and General Purposes Committee.
121- Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 16 November 1959.
Report of the Town Clerk.
122. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 10 April 1952
Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs; Non-European
Affairs Committee, meeting of 14 March 1955. Report of the
Manager of Non-European Affairs.
123. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 5 October 1951.
The Road to Sharpeville 40
Report o-f the Manager of Non-European Affairsj Public
Health, Licensing and Non-European Affairs Committee,
meeting o-f 11 January 1954. Report o-f the Manager o-f
Non-European Affairs. Non-European Affairs Committee,
meeting of 12 January 1953. Report of the Town Clerk.
124. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 11 July 1952.
Report of the Town Clerk. In theory, beer revenue could
still only be used for projects "certified by the Minister
of Native Affairs as being calculated to improve the social
or recreational amenities availabe for the native residents
or otherwise to promote the social welfare of such
residents". However, the 1952 amendments to the Urban Areas
Act provided for up to two thirds of beer profits to revert
to the main native revenue account where they could be used
to offset losses on housing schemes, and capital expenditure
on any works and services in connection with a township,
housing included. See Matthewson, The Establishment,
pp.121-22.
125. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 9 September 1953.
Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs.
126. V.A. 130/6. Union of South Africa, Department of Native
Affairs, Native (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, No 25 of
1945. Questionnaire to be completed in respect of the Urban
Area of Vereeniging - Sharpeville, 1955.
127. Town Council of Vereeniging, meeting of 30 July 1959.
Report of the Finance and General Purposes Committee.
128. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 8 February 1951.
Report of the Town Clerk.
129. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 10 May 1951.
Report of the Town Clerk.
130. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 3 March-1950.
Minutes of Sharpeville Advisory Board meeting held on 27
February 1950.
131. Transcript of an interview with The Sharpetown Swingsters
conducted by Ian Jeffrey, 22 January 1985.
132. This had to be done in an indirect way because there were
constraints placed on the use of Native Services Levy Funds
by the Native Affairs Department that prevented the Council
from simply transferring them to the Housing Account. Thus
Levy funds could only to cover expenses like those incurred
on providing electricity extensions, running water and
fences to houses in Sharpeville. See Non-European Affairs
Committee, meeting of 8 February 1955. Report of the Town
The Road to Sharpeville
Clerk. Public Health, Licensing and Non-European Affairs
Committee, meeting of H April 1955. Report of the Town
Clerk.
133. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 3 May 1954.
Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs.
134. Shakinovsky, *The Local State in Crisis', 3.
135. See the complaints in Non-European Affairs Committee,
meeting of 10 March 1950. Minutes of Sharpeville Advisory
Board meet ing held on 27 February 1950.
136. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 11 February 1952.
Report of the Town Clerk. The drive towards economic rentals
in Sharpeville actually preceded similar developments
elsewhere in the country by almost two years. It was only
when the Finance Act was passed late in 1953 that Section 19
of the Urban Areas Act, which had provided statutory support
for sub-economic rentals for African housing, was amended.
See Matthewson The Establishment, pp.113-14.
137. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 10 March 1953.
Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs.
13S. Public Health/ Licensing and Non-European Affairs Committee,
meeting of 8 February 1954- Report of the Manager of
Non-European Affairs.
139. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 16 August 1954.
Report of the Town Clerk. By 1954 the Native Affairs
Department had committed itself to making all township
rentals economic. Two years later this had been effected and
Matthewson wrote: "Housing funds for current developments
are thus provided at economic rates of interest and local
authorities are expected to recover their costs through
rents". The Establishment* p.114.
140. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 16 August 1954.
Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs.
141. Town Council of Vereeniging, meeting of 30 July 1959^ .
Report of the Finance and General Purposes Committee.
142. Town Council of Vereeniging, meeting of 25 October 1951.
Report of the Town Clerk.
143- See for example Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of
August 1956- Minutes of Sharpeville Advisory Board meeting
held on 26 July 1956.
144. Non—European Affairs Committee, meeting of 12 January 1959.
Minutes of Old Location Advisory Board meeting held on 8
December 1958-
The Road to Sharpeville 42
145. Minutes of Sharpevil le Advisory Board meeting held on 28,
July 1959 in Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting o-f 10
August 1959.
146. Union o-f South Africa. Verslag van die Kommissie wat benoem
is om ondersoek in te stel na en verslag uit te bring oor
die gebeure in die distrikte Vereeniging en Vanderbi.ilpark,
Provinsie Transvaal, OP 21 Maart 1960. (Copy held in
University of Witwatersrand Library, hereafter Verslag)
ch.2, p.12/ para.19.
147. See Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 8 February
1951. Report of the Town Clerk.
148. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 7 June 1954.
Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs.
149. USCO. Annual Report of the Union Steel Corporation, I960,
P-22.
150. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 12 August 1958.
Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs.
151. Interview with P. Thapeli, 27 August 1986; Interview with G,
Mabinetsa, 30 August 1986.
152. Tom, My Life Struggle, p.10. Russians' antipathy to youth
gangs was a feature common to townships across the PWV. See
Guy and Thabane ^Ma-Rashea*, pp.11-12.
153. Public Health, Licensing and Non-European Affairs Committee,
meeting of 8 March 1954. Minutes of Old Location Advisory
Board meeting held on 22 April 1954; Non-European Affairs
Committee, meeting of 9 October 1952- Minutes of Sharpeville
Advisory Board meeting held on 15 September 1952.
154. Public Health, Licensing and Non-European Affairs Committee,
meeting of 8 March 1954. Minutes of Sharpeville Advisory
Board meeting held on 24 February 1954
155. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 12 July 1955.
Minutes of Sharpeville Advisory Board meeting held on 23
June 1955.
156. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 18 January 1958.
Minutes of Sharpeville Advisory Board meeting held on 22
November 1957.
157. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 12 October 1953.
Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs.
158. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 9 March 1959.
Report of the Town Clerk.
The Road to Sharpeville 43
159- Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 15 November 1951.
Report o-f the Town Clerk.
160. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 8 February 1951.
Report of the Town Clerk.
161. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 14 November 1950.
Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs.
162. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 8 February 1951.
Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs.
163. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 6 August 1957.
Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs.
164. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 12 March 1951.
Report of the Town Clerk.
165. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 6 July 1958.
Minutes of Old Location Advisory Board meeting held on 23
June 1958.
166. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 6 July 1958.
Report of the Town Clerk.
167. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 10 February 1958.
Report *of the Manager of Non-European Affairs.
16B. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 10 February 1958.
Minutes of Sharpeville Advisory Board meeting held on 29
January 1958.
169. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 10 March 1958;
Report of the Town Clerk. Non-European Affairs Committee,
meeting of 9 April 195B. Report of the Town Clerk.
170. Tom, My Life Struggle, p.7.
171. Tom, My Life Struggle, P-7.
172. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 12 August 1958.
Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs.
173- Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 16 January 1950.
Minutes of Old Location Advisory Board meeting of 22
November 1949.
174. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 7 March 1957.
Minutes of Sharpeville Advisory Board meeting held on 20
February 1957. See also Guy and Thabane *Ma-Rashea'. Evaton
was a peri-urban freehold township, much less regulated than
both Sharpevil le and Top Location and thus a preferred
environment for the Russians.
The Road to Sharpeville 44
175. See for example Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting o-f
13 May 1955 and Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of .
11 February 1952- Minutes of Old Location Advisory Board
meeting held on 23 January 1952.
176- Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 7 March 1957.
Minutes of Sharpeville Advisory Board meeting held on 20
February 1957- Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 1
October 1957- Minutes of Old Location Advisory Board
meeting held on 23 September 1957.
177. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 5 February 1957-
Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs.
17B. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 5 February 1957.
Minutes of Sharpeville Advisory Board meeting held on 24
January 1957.
179. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 5 February 1957.
Minutes of Old Location Advisory Board meeting of 23 January
1957- Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 5 February
1957- Minutes of Sharpeville Advisory Board meeting held on
24 January 1957.
180. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 7 March 1957.
Minutes of Sharpeville Advisory Board meeting held on 20
February 1957
181. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 1 December 1949;
Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs. Non-European
Affairs Committee, meeting of 13 January 1955. Report of the
Manager of Non-European Affairs.
182- Tom, Mv Life Struggle, p.10.
183. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 11 July 1957.
Minutes of Sharpeville Advisory Board meeting held on 26
June 1957.
1B4. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 7 March 1957.
Minutes of Old Location Advisory Board meeting of 15
February 1957.
185. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 3 September 1957.
Minutes of Sharpeville Advisory Board meeting held on 22
July 1957.
186. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 3 September 1957.
Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs,
187. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 11 July 1957.
Report of the Town Clerk.
The Road to Sharpeville 45
188- Public Health, Licensing and Non-European Affairs Committee,
meeting of 8 February 1954. Report of the Town Clerk.
1B9. NDn-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 12 July 1955.
Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs.
190. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 15 August 1958.
Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs.
191. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 15 July 1958.
Report of the Town Clerk.
192. Interview with %Z'.
193. Tom/ Mv Life Struggle, p.6.
194. V.A. 130/6. Hellman, B. Letter to Manager of Non-European
Affairs, 15 April 1954.
195. See for example Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of
10 April 1954. Minutes of Sharpeville Advisory Board meeting
held on 25 March 1952.
196- See for example Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of
10 April 1954- Minutes of Old Location Advisory Board
meeting held on 23 February 1953.
197. V.A- 130/6. Hellman, B. Letter to Manager of Non-European
Affairs, 15 April 1954.
198. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 14 March 1955.
Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs-
199. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 9 August 1950.
Minutes of Old Location Advisory Board meeting held on 27
July 1951.
200. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 6 July 1953.
Minutes of Old Location Advisory Board meeting held on 23
June 1953.
201. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 5 May 1955.
Minutes of Old Location Advisory Board meeting held on 15
April 1955.
202. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 8 February 1951.
Minutes of Old Location Advisory Board meeting held on 30
January 1951.
203. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 9 February 1959.
Minutes of Sharpeville Advisory Board meeting held on 20
January 1959-
The Road to Sharpeville 46
204. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 11 June 1956.
Minutes of Old Location Advisory Board meeting held on 21
May 1956.
205. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 11 June 1956.
Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs.
206. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 12 June 1950.
Minutes of Old Location Advisory Board meeting held on 26
May 1950.
207. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 12 June 1950,
Minutes of Old Location Advisory Board meeting held on 26
May 1950.
208. Town Council of Vereeniging, meeting of 2B May 1957.
Report of the Finance and General Purposes Committee.
209. See Town Council of Vereeniging, meeting of 4 December 195B.
Report of the Finance and General Purposes Committee; Town
Council of Vereeniging, meeting of 27 May 1959. Report of
the Finance and General Purposes Committee; Finance and
General Purposes Committee Meeting November 1954. Report of
the Town Clerk.
210. Town Council of Vereeniging, meeting of 4 December 195S.
Report of the Finance and General Purposes Committee.
211. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 18 November 1958.
Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs.
212. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 2 September 1953.
Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs.
213. Tom, My Life Struggle, p.22.
214. Tom, My Life Struggle, pp.22-3.
215. Verwoerd explained the rationale behind site and service
schemes to the Federated Chambers of Industry on 26 May
1954* »we accept that for quite a long time to come these
Bantu in the urban areas must be accomodated. Huge numbers
must, however, sometimes be dealt with in as short a time as
possible - numbers so large that this country cannot
undertake the financial burden if we must house them within
a brief period on lines which would fully fulfil all
expectations. Everybody realises that to build houses for
the Bantu on the basis of a structure costing $600-$800 is
an impossible task - even though the cost of housing has
been brought down, it is quite impossible to find either the
funds or the material or the labour to build within a short
period and even in this fshion for all those who may
legitimately be said to beed (sic) housing. What must be
done? Must we build for the 5 per cent or 10 per cent and
The Road to Sharpeville 47
•forget the other 90 per cent? Must we have them as illegal
squatters or illegal lodgers either in the Bantu residential
areas or European backyards? We must discover that
alternative method by which we can aid the whole 100 per
cent to some extent as rapidly as possible with the object
of them effecting -further improvements gradually. There is
only one way in which this can be done. That is by laying
out a whole village or the villages needed, and bringing in
the squatters and placing each family on one site of roughly
60 by 40 feet... The services are provided which are needed
- water> sanitation/ roads, perhaps even light, possibly in
rudimentary form. Then the person can build himself/
especially under guidance, and primarily perhaps only an
ordinary squatter's home. But this is the beginning of
village development." Quoted in Matthewson, The
Establishment, p.66. See also V.A. 130/15.
Medical Officer of Health/ Vereeniging. Letter to Town
Clerk, 6 July 1954.
216. Non-European Affairs Committee/ meeting of 7 May 195?.
Minutes of Old Location Advisory Board meeting held on 21
March 1957-
217. V.A. 130/15. Medical Officer of Health/ Vereeniging. Letter
to Town Clerk, 6 July 1954.
218. Non-European Affairs Committee/ meeting of 10 September
1954. Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs.
219. Non-European Affairs Committee/ meeting of 10 March 1958.
Report of the Town Clerk.
220. Non-European Affairs Committee/ meeting of 12 May 195B.
Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs.
221. Non-European Affairs Committee/ meeting of 10 August 1959.
Minutes of Old Location Advisory Board meeting held on 23
July 1959.
222. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 12 October 1959.
Minutes o-f Old Location Advisory Board meeting held on 28
September 1959.
223.' Non-European Affairs Committee/ meeting of 9 June 1959.
Minutes of Old Location Advisory Board meeting held on 27
May 1959.
224. Non-European Affairs Committee/ meeting of 9 June 1959.
Minutes of Old Location Advisory Board meeting held on 27
May 1959.
225. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 12 January 1959.
Minutes of Old Location Advisory Board meeting held on 8
December 1958.
The Road to Sharpeville . 48
226. The meeting to organise the march to the Sharpeville Police
Station was held in the site and service scheme, which was
also where the inarch started. See Verslag p.71, para.122. and
p.94, para.145.
227. V.A. 95/2, vol. Acting Director of Non-European Affairs,
Vereeniging. Letter to Town Clerk, 30 July 1953. 2.
228. V.A. 95/2, vol.2. Town Clerk of Vereeniging. Letter to Bantu
Affairs Commissioner, 14 July 1959.
229. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 10 August 1959.
Minutes of Sharpeville Advisory Board meeting held on 28
July 1959.
230. V.A- 95/2, vol.2. New Arrivals in Topville. Letter to the
Secretary for Native Affairs, 2S May 1959.
231. V.A. 95/2, vol.2. Bantu Affairs Commissioner- Letter to Town
Clerk of Vereeniging, 21 July 1959.
232. V-A- 95/2, vol. Acting Director of Non-European Affairs,
Vereeniging. Letter to Town Clerk, 30 July 1959. 2.
233. It was almost as though the Council was so caught up in its
image of Sharpeville as the best administered and equipped
township in the Union that it refused to accept that
residents of Sharpeville could have any grievances at all
and it consistently ignored the advice of the Sharpeville
Advisory Board on a wide range of issues. In the long run
this proved to be a costly mistake, for the conservative
board members shared many of the concerns of the Council but
were, of necessity, a little more sensitive to the
grievances of the Sharpeville population- This greater
sensitivity should not be overstated - the board's
constituency was the Sharpeville petit bourgeoisie and it
was not generally able to identify, a political community
beyond this constituency.Thus the chairman of the board
could argue that if the Council accepted the Board's request
for lower rents for shopkeepers, "people will learn-that the
Board is their mouthpiece and this will hamper the
activities of agitators if there be any" <Non-European
Affairs Committee meeting of 7 March 1957. Minutes of
Sharpeville Advisory Board meeting held on 20 February
1957). Nevertheless, had the Council cooperated more
closely with the board, they would have been better able to
identify the tensions building up in Sharpeville over the
fifties and would have been in a stronger position to
prevent their ultimate explosion on 21 March 1960.
234. Town Council of Vereeniging, meeting of 2S October 1959. In
context it is clear that voldongg feit refers to beter
behuisingsomstandiqhede and not to noodsaaklikheid.
The Road to Sharpeville **9
235. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 13 October 1958.
Minutes o-f Sharpeville Advisory Board meeting held on 24
September 1958 (Kolisang withdrew his resignation at the*
next board meeting).
236. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 10 August 1959.
237- Source* Non-European Affairs Committee/ meetings from 10
November 1949 to 16 November 1959.
238. Lodge, Black Politics, p.208.
239. See Non-European Affairs Committee/ meeting of 14 February
1956. Report of the Town Clerk.
240. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 12 October 1959.
Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs.
241. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 18 November 1959.
Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs.
242. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 12 October 1959.
Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs.
243. Town Council of Vereeniging, meeting of 28 October 1959.
Mayoral Minute for the Year Ending October 1959.
244. Verslag, p.14, para.27.
245. verslaq, p.14, para.26.
246. Source1 Non-European Affairs Committee, meetings from 10
November 1949 to 16 November 1959.
247. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 9 June 1959.
Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs.
248. Town Council of Vereeniging, meeting of 28 October 1959.
Mayoral Minute for the Year Ending October 1959.
249. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 8 January 1960.
Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs.
250. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 8 February 1960.
Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs.
251. See Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 14 March
1960. Report of the Town Clerk.
252. The next Council meeting only took place on 30 March and
unsurprisingly did not include a statement about the report
in The Star.
The Road to Sharpeville 50
253. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 14 March I960.
Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs.
254. Verslag P.45, para.84 and p.19, para.35.
255. Lodge, Black Politics, p.208.
256. Tom, My Life Struggle, p.23.
257. See Verslag p.45, para.84; pp.96-7, para.147. It seems that
the PAC were able to tap into Sharpeville youth gang
networks. The Commission of Enquiry reported that the PAC
had deliberately attempted to recruit gang members. Whether
not this was the case, the fact that groups of youths went
through the entire township from house to house on the night
of Sunday 20 March, demanding that residents support the
demonstration the following day, indicates at least a
probable link between the PAC and the youth gangs. See also
Tom, My Life Struggle, pp.24-5.
258. See Verslag p.71, para.122; p.94, para.145. Two marches
converged on the police station prior to the shootings. The
one came from the site-and-service scheme the other from the
housing scheme in Sharpeville Extension 1.
259. Tom, My Life Struggle, p.24.
260. Verslag, p.48, para.B8j p.49, para.89; p.62, para.108.
261. In addition to forming a well known part of the popular
traditions of resistance in South Africa, they are covered
in Lodge, Black Politics, Tom, My Life Struggle and Roux,
Time Longer than Rope. For the most detailed accounts see
Reeves, Shootings at Sharpeville and Verslag.
262. Town Council of Vereeniging, meeting of 25 May 1960.
Report of the Finance and General Purposes Committee.
263. Town Council of Vereeniging, meeting of 26 July 1960.
Report of the Finance and General Purposes Committee.
264. See Town Council of Vereeniging, meetings of 26 July 1960
and 27 August 1960. Reports of the Finance and General
Purposes Committee.
